President Lee Jae-myung Accelerates Constitutional Reform: 4-Year Re-election System and Power Structure Overhaul

President Lee Jae-myung Accelerates Constitutional Reform: 4-Year Re-election System and Power Structure Overhaul Sparks National Debate

September 26, 2025 - South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is advancing ambitious constitutional reform proposals that would fundamentally restructure the nation's governing framework established through the democratic Constitution of 1987—the founding document of modern Korean democracy following successful pro-democracy movements that ended authoritarian military rule and established the constitutional order under which South Korea has evolved from emerging market democracy to mature advanced economy and influential middle power on the global stage. The most politically explosive element of President Lee's reform agenda proposes replacing South Korea's unique single five-year presidential term with a four-year term allowing one re-election opportunity—a change that supporters characterize as modernizing democratic institutions and enabling policy continuity while critics condemn as dangerous power consolidation that undermines critical constitutional safeguards deliberately designed to prevent the authoritarian leadership patterns that dominated Korean politics from independence in 1948 through democratization in 1987.

The constitutional reform debate, intensifying ahead of potential 2026 referendum timing, reflects deeper tensions about South Korean democracy's maturation process, appropriate institutional design balancing executive effectiveness against authoritarian risk, and competing visions for the nation's political future amid complex domestic challenges including demographic crisis (world's lowest fertility rate of 0.72 children per woman), economic restructuring pressures (transitioning from manufacturing-export model toward services and innovation), geopolitical tensions with North Korea and navigating great power competition between United States and China, and persistent social divisions along generational, regional, and ideological lines that complicate efforts to build consensus around major institutional changes requiring supermajority support and national referendum approval representing broad public buy-in beyond narrow partisan advantage calculations.

Constitutional Context: Understanding South Korea's Single-Term Presidential System

For American readers familiar with US presidential system allowing two four-year terms (totaling potential eight years in office), South Korea's current constitutional framework represents fundamentally different institutional logic prioritizing different democratic values and reflecting distinct historical experiences shaping institutional design choices. South Korean presidents serve precisely one five-year term with absolute prohibition on re-election regardless of popularity, performance, or political circumstances—a rigid constraint unique among major democracies and deliberately imposed through the 1987 constitutional revision process that ended authoritarian rule and established contemporary democratic institutions following decades of military-backed governments that systematically violated previous constitutional term limit provisions and maintained power through electoral manipulation, emergency decree authorities, and outright coups d'état overturning civilian leadership.

The single-term restriction originated specifically as democratic safeguard against South Korea's authoritarian legacy stretching from Park Chung-hee's military coup in 1961 through Chun Doo-hwan's violent seizure of power in 1980—both leaders initially promising temporary military rule to restore order and eliminate corruption but subsequently manipulating constitutional provisions, rigging referendums, and crushing opposition to maintain power for 18 years (Park, 1961-1979 until assassination by his own intelligence chief) and 7 years (Chun, 1980-1987 until forced from office by massive pro-democracy demonstrations) respectively. These traumatic experiences convinced pro-democracy reformers that only absolute term limits preventing any possibility of extended presidential tenure could adequately safeguard against future authoritarian backsliding—a judgment informed by repeated failures of previous constitutional frameworks containing weaker term limit provisions that proved inadequate when authoritarian-minded leaders faced with expiring terms simply rewrote rules through constitutional manipulation, fake referendums, or military force.

The resulting 1987 Constitution's single five-year term represents democratic activists' deliberate choice prioritizing authoritarian prevention over executive effectiveness, accepting inevitable policy discontinuities and lame-duck vulnerabilities as acceptable costs for preventing concentrated power accumulation that previous Korean history demonstrated could metastasize into authoritarian control when institutional safeguards proved insufficient against determined leaders commanding security services and willing to employ violence suppressing opposition. Comparative democratic analysis identifies this institutional choice as relatively unusual—most presidential systems worldwide permit re-election (United States' two-term limit, France's no limit until 2008 reform imposed two-term maximum, Russia's technically unlimited terms enabling Putin's extended tenure) while parliamentary systems allow indefinite prime ministerial service conditional on maintaining legislative confidence (Germany's Angela Merkel served 16 years, United Kingdom's Margaret Thatcher 11 years, Japan's Shinzo Abe 8+ years across two separate periods)—but South Korean designers judged that unusual rigidity justified given unusual historical circumstances and specific authoritarian risks their society confronted.

However, the single-term system generates well-documented governance challenges that reform advocates emphasize: presidents become "lame ducks" almost immediately after election as political rivals and even coalition partners position for the next presidential race rather than supporting incumbent policy agendas; major policy initiatives requiring multi-year implementation timelines face discontinuity risks when succeeding presidents from opposing parties systematically reverse predecessors' programs regardless of merit; presidents lack electoral accountability mechanisms that re-election possibility creates in systems where leaders seeking second terms must deliver results satisfying voters rather than pursuing ideologically-driven or politically risky policies knowing they face no future electoral judgment; and talented political leaders reaching presidency at relatively young ages (Kim Dae-jung elected at 74, but Moon Jae-in at 64, Lee Myung-bak at 66, Park Geun-hye at 60, current President Lee Jae-myung at 59) serve only five years before mandatory retirement from executive power despite potentially possessing decades of productive public service capacity and accumulated governing experience valuable for addressing complex policy challenges.

President Lee's Reform Proposal: Four-Year Terms with Re-election Possibility

President Lee Jae-myung's constitutional reform package, formally proposed in March 2025 and currently undergoing legislative review processes in the Democratic Party-controlled National Assembly, would replace the single five-year term with four-year terms allowing one re-election opportunity—essentially adopting the American presidential system's term structure while maintaining mechanisms attempting to address South Korean concerns about authoritarian risks through additional proposed constitutional amendments strengthening legislative oversight, judicial independence, and civil liberty protections. The reform's advocates, primarily concentrated within the ruling Democratic Party but including some opposition figures and constitutional scholars, argue this change would generate multiple benefits: enabling successful presidents to continue effective policies rather than arbitrary five-year disruptions based on calendar rather than performance; creating electoral accountability by requiring presidents seeking second terms to demonstrate competent governance rather than pursuing ideological projects without electoral consequences; allowing Korea's maturing democracy to transition away from institutional designs appropriate for democratization's fragile early stages but increasingly dysfunctional as democracy consolidates and institutional stability enables relaxing extreme safeguards whose costs outweigh residual authoritarian risks; and aligning South Korean institutions with most other advanced democracies permitting leadership continuity when voters support incumbent performance.

The four-year term structure (rather than maintaining five-year terms while simply adding re-election option) reflects deliberate design choices: four-year electoral cycles synchronize better with National Assembly elections also scheduled every four years, potentially enabling presidential and legislative elections coinciding on common dates that increase voter turnout, reduce election administration costs and campaign fatigue from constant electoral mobilization, and might encourage greater party discipline as legislative candidates' fates tie more directly to presidential performance when campaigns occur simultaneously. Additionally, four-year terms balance desires for policy continuity against concerns about excessive incumbent advantages and political stagnation, splitting the difference between very short terms (two-three years) that could produce ineffective leadership constantly campaigning for re-election versus very long terms (six-seven years) that entrench leaders insulated from accountability for extended periods.

However, the re-election possibility remains politically explosive given Korean historical memory and genuine concerns about authoritarian reversion risks that even South Korea's successful democratization cannot entirely eliminate, as illustrated by recent democratic backsliding in Hungary, Poland (before recent reversal), Turkey, the Philippines, and Venezuela demonstrating that constitutional democracies can deteriorate toward authoritarianism when determined leaders exploit institutional vulnerabilities, polarize societies, capture regulatory agencies, intimidate opposition, and manipulate electoral systems while technically maintaining constitutional forms. Critics spanning the conservative People Power Party opposition, civic activist groups, legal scholars concerned about power concentration, and segments of public opinion suspicious of executive aggrandizement argue that abandoning the single-term safeguard would invite precisely the authoritarian risks it was designed to prevent, enabling future presidents to leverage re-election prospects pressuring legislators through promises and threats, manipulating government resources and policy timing for electoral advantage, and potentially undermining democratic safeguards through gradual accumulation of power across multiple terms that single-term restriction currently prevents by guaranteeing automatic turnover every five years regardless of incumbent preferences.

Broader Constitutional Reform Package: Restructuring Government Power

President Lee's reform proposals extend beyond presidential term structures to encompass comprehensive constitutional amendments addressing multiple perceived deficiencies in current institutional arrangements and power distribution among executive, legislative, and judicial branches plus relationships between national government and provincial/local governments managing significant administrative and fiscal responsibilities. These broader reforms include: strengthening National Assembly legislative powers through enhanced oversight mechanisms, confirmation authorities over key executive appointments, and fiscal policy influence currently concentrated in executive branch budgeting processes; expanding Constitutional Court jurisdiction and independence protecting against political interference in judicial review processes determining legislation's constitutional validity; reinforcing civil liberty protections and human rights guarantees against government overreach in areas including privacy rights (particularly concerning digital surveillance capabilities), freedom of assembly and expression (protecting political protests and dissent), and equal protection provisions combating discrimination; and redistributing fiscal resources and policy authorities from centralized national government toward provincial and local governments potentially enabling more responsive governance addressing regional diversity across Korea's different economic zones and population centers.

These institutional restructuring proposals reflect Democratic Party's progressive political philosophy generally favoring distributed power arrangements, stronger legislative checks on executive authority, robust civil liberty protections, and decentralized governance compared to conservative alternatives typically emphasizing executive efficiency, security priorities potentially justifying civil liberty restrictions, and centralized authority concentrating policy-making in national government institutions. The reform package's comprehensiveness serves both substantive and tactical purposes: substantively, interconnected reforms address related institutional deficiencies where piecemeal changes might prove ineffective without complementary adjustments (for example, expanding presidential terms without simultaneously strengthening legislative oversight could dangerously concentrate power); tactically, comprehensive packages allow coalition-building trading support across different reform elements appealing to diverse constituencies, while presenting reforms as coherent democratic modernization projects rather than narrow presidential self-interest.

However, constitutional amendment processes under South Korea's 1987 Constitution impose extremely high approval thresholds deliberately making changes difficult and requiring broad consensus: amendments must achieve two-thirds supermajority support (200 of 300 members) in the National Assembly and subsequently win majority approval in national referendum—institutional hurdles designed ensuring constitutional stability and preventing narrow partisan majorities from manipulating fundamental governance rules for temporary political advantage. The Democratic Party currently controls approximately 175 National Assembly seats, falling 25 votes short of the required two-thirds threshold and necessitating substantial opposition People Power Party support to advance constitutional amendments to referendum stage, creating political dynamics where opposition may leverage constitutional reform demands to extract policy concessions, institutional compromises, or other political benefits in exchange for providing crucial votes enabling reform referendums.

International and Strategic Implications for US-Korea Alliance

South Korea's constitutional reform debate carries implications extending beyond domestic politics to encompass international relationships, strategic partnerships, and geopolitical stability in Northeast Asia where the Korean Peninsula remains technically at war (only armistice, not peace treaty, ended the 1950-1953 Korean War), North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses persistent security threats to South Korea, Japan, and United States military personnel stationed in the region, and intensifying US-China strategic competition creates diplomatic and economic pressures forcing South Korea into difficult balancing acts between its crucial security alliance with Washington and its largest trading partner relationship with Beijing accounting for 25% of Korean exports despite political tensions and security concerns about Chinese regional ambitions.

For American strategic planners and policymakers, South Korean political stability and policy predictability directly affect multiple vital interests: maintaining the US-Korea military alliance stationing 28,500 American troops on Korean soil serving as frontline deterrent against North Korean aggression and broader symbol of American security commitments throughout Indo-Pacific region reassuring allies including Japan, Australia, and smaller Southeast Asian nations concerned about Chinese military expansion; ensuring continued economic partnership where two-way trade exceeds $170 billion annually and Korean companies including Samsung, SK Hynix, and Hyundai represent crucial technology and manufacturing partners for American firms across semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, and displays; coordinating diplomatic approaches toward North Korea's nuclear program where South Korean engagement or hardline stances significantly influence regional dynamics and negotiation prospects; and managing technology competition with China where South Korean cooperation on export controls, supply chain security, and technology standards affects American efforts limiting Chinese access to advanced semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and dual-use technologies with military applications.

Constitutional reform potentially affecting presidential tenure and policy continuity introduces both opportunities and risks for alliance management: extended presidential terms could enable deeper personal relationships between American and Korean leaders facilitating coordination and crisis management (the strong personal rapport between President Joe Biden and former President Moon Jae-in contributed to close alliance cooperation during Biden's term), policy continuity reducing disruptive reversals when new presidents from opposing parties dramatically shift positions on alliance management, and longer-term strategic planning horizons enabling major initiatives like joint weapons development, integrated missile defense systems, or combined military force restructuring requiring multi-year implementation impossible under current single-term constraints. However, risks include potential authoritarian backsliding that could complicate alliance relationship if Korean democracy deteriorates toward illiberal governance patterns conflicting with American values and raising congressional concerns about military partnerships with increasingly authoritarian governments, political polarization and domestic instability during extended reform debates potentially distracting from alliance management and reducing Korean policy bandwidth for external engagements, and uncertainty effects where major constitutional changes create transitional periods where Korean policy directions remain unclear complicating American strategic planning and alliance investments requiring long-term commitments.

Source: Korea Trendy News